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Abstract: Security interventions – such as Web warnings – currently do not work.
One approach to remedy the situation is to make the communication of risks in the
interventions more understandable and motivating. Mental models that users have of
security have been studied to accomplish these aims, primarily to better align the in-
tervention with the mental model of the users. However, the users’ mental models
are currently foremost understood in broad groups such as of lay and expert users
– while risk communication literature proposes to individualize the communication.
To explore how the mental-models approach can be combined with individualization,
we analyze in a qualitative card-sorting study how lay and expert users assess risks
connected to Web sites in this paper. Our study indicates the diversity of mental mod-
els, both between the two groups and between individuals, particularly related to their
preferences (e.g. concerning privacy or financial consequences). Based on these re-
sults, we propose four strategies on how to effectively improve security interventions
through individualization.
1 Introduction
A current strand of research in information security considers the behavior of users inter-
acting with security mechanisms to follow a “bounded rationality”: When users behave
in insecure manners, this is often due to a lack of motivation because they neglect conse-
quences or externalities [AS99, Her10]. One way to influence the behavior to better align
it with the user’s actual goals is to better communicate the risks involved – for example,
when warning against accessing a potentially fraudulent Web site. However, the prob-
lem with warnings in Web browsers is that they do not work [SEA+09]. Regarding risk
communication, literature indicates that Web warnings are not understood, leading to sub-
optimal behavior [BLCDK11, DHC06]. We thus focus on warnings in Web browsers as a
case in point for improving risk communication in security interventions in this paper1.
1Generally, it should be the goal to reduce warnings to a minimum to prevent habituation effects. However,
risks still need to be communicated when the adequate behavior cannot be chosen automatically and the decision
A recent approach in information security to influence behavior is to take the mental mod-
els of security that users have into account [Cam09, Was10]. For example, Wash and Rader
[WR11] suggested to influence the mental models of users to improve security decisions
and Bravo-Lillo et al. [BLCDK11] applied mental models to security warnings. However,
this prior research treats users as broad groups – for example, distinguishing lay from
expert users2. On the other hand, De Keukelaere et al. [DYT+09] showed how individu-
alization of warnings can improve the effectiveness. Therefore, our goal in this paper is to
combine the mental-models approach with the individualization of security interventions
for more effective risk communication.
For this goal, we study the assessment of Web risks as an operationalization of risk percep-
tion and mental models at a higher level of detail than in prior research. We qualitatively
study through card sorting how users perceive risks on Web sites both on a structural level
(What types of concepts do the users perceive as risks?) and regarding content (What
threats and consequences do they perceive as risks?). Since prior studies showed general
differences between lay and expert users (c.f. [ALC07]), we compare lay users’ percep-
tions with those of experts in addition to analyzing the differences on an individual level.
In our study, lay and expert users show different structures of risk perceptions and differ-
ences in what they consider risks. For example, lay users more often rely on page types
and abstract risks, while experts consider concrete consequences. Moreover, our research
shows that the individual lay and expert users differ widely in these respects.
Our results support the notion that for the most comprehensible and effective risk commu-
nication, security interventions need to be individualized. We build upon the research on
mental models by Wash and Rader [WR11] and propose concrete approaches to elicit and
adapt the individual user’s mental model. In particular, we describe strategies on how to
make mental-models–based individualized security interventions practically feasible.
2 Risk communication and information security
Risk communication – the communication of potential harmful events, consequences, and
probabilities – has been studied in diverse disciplines. For medical risk communications,
for example, to enable profound decisions on treatment options, Rothman and Kiviniemi
[RK99] state that making risks concrete is more successful in creating awareness and in-
fluencing behavior. Cognitive psychology indicates that it is important that people are able
to “simulate” or imagine the antecedents and consequences of risks [KT82]. For medical
risks, consequences (symptoms) that are easier to picture increase the awareness, as do
testimonials of affected individuals when there is an identification with those [RK99].
In information security, risk communication has received attention from the research com-
needs to be delegated to the user. In case of Web warnings, the adequate decision often depends on too many
factors of which many are not available to the system. For example, can the system decide that a user should be
blocked from accessing an insecure banking site even if he only plans to check on interest rates?
2We refer to “lay users” as individuals not professionally related to security. We contrast these to “expert
users,” but emphasize that the lay–expert dualism only applies to security-related expertise and try to avoid
valuation of either group.
munity regarding security warnings. Particularly, for Web security, it was shown that ex-
isting warnings are often ineffective [DTH06, ECH08]. However, the content of warnings
can be improved to make users more responsive to the warnings [BvOP+09]. For example,
Kauer et al. [KPV+12] found that individuals are less likely to ignore warnings when they
perceived personal risks, corresponding to the experience from medical risk communica-
tion. To achieve this, De Keukelaere et al. [DYT+09] proposed to individualize warnings
to make them more effective, adapting them to the users’ expertise and prior experience.
We follow this approach in this paper.
3 Users’ perceptions and mental models of security risks
One promising way of individualizing risk communication to make it more effective is by
taking the users’ perception and understanding of security risks into account. Friedman et
al. [FHH+02] found that security concerns differ between users’ backgrounds in a study
with participants from rural and urban areas. In a survey on online risk perception, Garg
and Camp [GC12] analyzed how users perceive different kinds of risks and found that
severity and temporal (when it will occur) factors were the most important factors. Onarli-
oglu et al. [OYKB12] confronted 164 users in an online study with various online threats
on a test platform to explore their reactions. They argue that users can mitigate threats
even without full understanding by using their intuition. However, users rely on simple
cues which may be easily forged, such as the length of a URL.
Users’ perception of risks is influenced by their models of how the environment reacts
to actions – mental models [JL80]. Mental models have been employed to explain and
improve the comprehensibility and influence behavior in various fields. For instance, in
the risk communication for medical drugs, treatment advice in package inserts were less
effective when they did not correspond to consistent mental models [JST88]. For computer
security, Camp [Cam09] studied what mental models users have, considering, for instance,
a physical security model, through the analogy of locks and doors, but also a warfare
model. Asgharpour et al. [ALC07] found that there are differences between the mental
models of expert and lay users. For security warnings, Bravo-Lillo et al. [BLCDK11]
developed general mental models of expert and lay users on security warnings. They
showed the differences between the two groups, with the lay-user mental model being
less comprehensive and in part wrong. For lay users (“folks”), Wash [Was10] studied
their mental models (“folk models”) of general computer security. These include different
models of the concepts of viruses or malware and of those of hackers or aggressors. Wash
and Rader [WR11] argue that we need to accept that users have different mental models,
but can influence the models for more secure behavior. Morgan et al. [MFBA02] suggest
to elicit mental models of expert and lay users to identify those beliefs of lay users that
most need correction for effectively influencing behavior.
Even though the mental-model approach seems promising for improving the risk commu-
nication in information security, it is still unclear how to effectively leverage the approach’
potential. To propose actionable approaches, we extend this research on users’ risk per-
ception by combining it with the individualization of the risk communication in security
interventions (cf. Section 2). In particular, we not only consider the differences between
the broad groups of expert and lay users, but emphasize the differences between individu-
als to these ends.
4 Study on the perception of Web risks
To explore novel practical approaches for individualizing the risk communication by ap-
plying the mental-models approach, we study and compare the perception of Web risks
by lay and expert users. We employ the assessment of risks and risk perceptions as an
operationalization of mental models since we expect that the mentioning of specific risks
indicates the knowledge of the underlying causalities.
4.1 Study design
4.1.1 Procedure
To explore the perceptions of Web-related risks, we conducted a card-sorting experiment
[RM97]. In card sorting, participants are confronted with a set of cards, in this case Web
sites, and asked to group the cards into categories based on specified criteria. Card sorting
has already been used in HCISec successfully – for example, to analyze how individuals
restrict access in Social Networks [KBM+11] and to explore the general mental models of
security of expert and lay users [ALC07]. Our goal was to motivate the participants to talk
about the factors that influence their categorization. Thus, we were only interested in the
process of the categorization and did not predetermine the categories to prevent bias (open
card sort [ALC07]).
Specifically, we asked expert and lay users to imagine to have user accounts at 67 Web
sites, which were presented to them as the cards to be sorted in the form of printed DIN-
A5 screenshots of the pages (“picture sorting” giving visual clues [RM97, p. 83]). The
task was to categorize the Web sites according to the consequences of their account on
the respective Web site being compromised. When Web sites were unknown, the partic-
ipants could inquire details and were provided general information on the type of page,
the potential activities, and further information on specific request3. The participants were
encouraged to think aloud while completing the task. Lastly, they completed an exit ques-
tionnaire for demographics.
We selected the 67 Web sites (within the range of 30 to 100 cards as suggested in literature
[Spe09]) from the Top-500 most visited sites in Germany according to Alexa.com. From
the first 60 of the Top-500, we removed excessive duplicates in types of Web sites (e.g.
information sites, email providers). We then added missing types from the Top-500 (e.g.
job portals), to arrive at a broad range of Web sites.
3We were aware of the potential bias that the provided information could introduce and were careful only to
provide the requested information.
4.1.2 Participant sampling
We recruited seven expert and seven lay users for the experiment from personal contacts
and did not offer a reward for participation. We defined experts as individuals profes-
sionally related to information security. The personal recruitment strategy allowed us to
achieve a broad coverage of security experts (average age 37, youngest 28, oldest 52),
including system administrators, security researchers, and security consultants.
The seven lay-user participants were recruited to cover a broad range of average users,
not professionally related to information security, but not representative, with an average
age of 23.1 (youngest 22, oldest 25) – 2 female and 5 male. Five lay users stated in the
exit questionnaire to use the Internet several times a day, and all lay users had already
conducted transactions at online shops. The lay users were evenly distributed between
regularly and never using online banking and social networking sites. Similarly broad
was the distribution concerning computer literacy: Confronted with computer problems,
three stated that they “receive help from others,” two “help others but receive help from
others for difficult problems”, and two “help others also with difficult problems.” Thus,
while limited in breadth of age groups, the sampling achieved a broad range of general
expertise.
4.1.3 Analysis
The experiment was audio-recorded and the categorization process was qualitatively an-
alyzed. Bryman [Bry88] argues that qualitative research methods result in “rich, deep”
data (p. 94), as needed for the analysis of a broad range of arguments for categorizing Web
sites by risks. We chose a Grounded-Theory approach [GS67] for the analysis, because of
its strength in systematically identifying and categorizing concepts in rich data, and since
it has been successfully employed in HCISec [ALC08]. The open coding of categoriza-
tion argumentation resulted in 795 raw quotes that we then consolidated (axial coding) to
eight primary and 52 secondary concepts. For example, this assessment of the TV guide
tvinfo.de:
[They have] further information then for me. . . if someone sets wrong prefer-
ences for me, this will come back to me, and I will find out quickly that the
information is not sent to my email address anymore
was coded regarding Type of page factors: Content: Information (the content of the Web
site is information); and Risk-related factors: Consequence: Modification/Concrete (mod-
ified preferences), Scenario: Concrete (someone sets wrong preferences), and Further
risk: Concrete (will be found out quickly). Content, Consequence, Scenario, and Further
risk denote the primary concepts in this quote. For internal validity, the coding was con-
ducted by one of the authors. The coded quotes were then quantitatively analyzed by the
number of mentions of each concept as described below.
The experiment was conducted in German, with the coding in English and quotes trans-







Figure 1: High-level argumentation patterns
Concept Examples Lay Expert p < 0.05
Type-of-page arguments 225 58% 134 38% Yes
Activity Publishing, shopping 97 25% 68 19% No
Institution Bank, forum 78 20% 50 14% No
Context Job, leisure 28 7% 12 3% No
Content Information, media 22 6% 4 1% No
Risk-factor arguments 172 45% 236 67% Yes
Data Personal contacts, credit card # 101 26% 126 36% No
Consequence Financial loss, annoyance 63 16% 148 42% Yes
Scenario How to misuse data 75 19% 148 42% Yes
Further risk Relevance, probability 90 23% 142 40% No
Total 385 354
Table 1: Primary concepts used in the categorization of Web sites
4.2 Expert- and lay-user perceptions
Since prior research shows different perceptions and different mental models between ex-
pert and lay users, we expected that we can reproduce these findings. Extending prior
work, we particularly focused on the concepts that the two groups employed (how they
argued) and what factors were frequently mentioned:
4.2.1 Argumentation patterns
We analyzed the arguments that participants stated while categorizing the Web sites for
their consequences. The argumentation followed different patterns (cf. Figure 1): One op-
tion was to argue based on the features of the page (“Type of page”) in one or more of four
different language constructs (cf. Table 1: Activities that the user may conduct on the Web
site, the Institution that it represents, its Context of use, or its Content). Second, partici-
pants used risk factors for the categorization (the type of personal Data stored/requested
by the Web site, the Consequence of an attack, Scenarios of how the adversary could
misuse the account, and/or moderating Further risk factors). As indicated by the arrows
in Figure 1, the line of argument could only involve either Type-of-page or Risk fac-
tors, or it could include both to explain the categorization. For example, for the quote in
Section 4.1.3, the argumentation would include Type-of-page (content) and Risk factors
(Consequence, Scenario, Further risk).
Table 1 shows for each primary concept how often an argument of the respective type was
Risk concept Lay Expert p < 0.05
Data-related arguments 101 59% 126 53% No
Concrete 41 24% 86 36% No
Consequence arguments 63 37% 148 63% Yes
Concrete 34 20% 112 47% Yes
Scenario descriptions 75 44% 148 63% Yes
Concrete 22 13% 114 48% Yes
Further risk factors 90 52% 142 60% No
Concrete 3 2% 65 28% Yes
Table 2: Concreteness for different risk concepts
used to explain the categorization of a Web site4. Expert and lay users significantly differ in
their argumentation. Experts more frequently used the risk-factor arguments, particularly
the specific consequence, the risks, and the scenarios, than lay users (as the expert did in
the example in Section 4.1.3). Lay users, in contrast, more often relied on the Type-of-
page factors of a Web site without explicitly considering risk factors – for example, only
the possible activities (“Eventim, that’s where one may buy, order tickets”).
4.2.2 Comprehensiveness and concreteness of risk factors
Not only did lay users less often discuss risk factors than experts; when they did, they did
so less structured and less concrete. Experts generally tended to approach the categoriza-
tion in a more structured manner, considering the consequences more comprehensively:
They more often did not rely only on one factor to decide on the categorization, but, for
example, considered several possible threats. This is reflected in the quantities in Table 1
in the higher total number of risk-factor arguments for experts for the same number of
cards. Similarly, experts rather formulated concrete scenarios and named the concrete
consequence (“modifies my preferences”) or affected personal data (“bank account data
put there”), and the concrete evaluation of specific risk factors (“I will find out quickly”),
instead of only mentioning solely a general risk level such as “I’d classify it as compara-
tively bad” when categorizing Web sites (cf. concreteness in Table 2).
4.2.3 Differences regarding mentioned types of data and consequences
A further difference between the argumentation of expert and lay users were the priori-
ties that they appeared to assign to specific types of data that might be affected and types
of consequences that might occur when their account is compromised. Table 3 shows
the most common types of data and consequences that participants referred to when they
mentioned risk factors while categorizing Web sites. For example, lay users more fre-
quently mentioned financial data when arguing with risk factors. Conversely, lay users
4Since each raw quote could be coded as multiple Type-of-page or Risk factors, sums and proportions do
not add up. We applied a Welch Two Sample t-test on the individuals’ proportions and noted in the last column
for which proportion the differences between expert and lay users are significant, i.e. the null hypothesis was
rejected because of p < 0.05.
Risk concept Examples Lay Expert p < 0.05
Data-related arguments 101 59% 126 53% No
Personal Real name, contacts 42 24% 44 19% No
Financial Credit card #, bank account # 32 19% 19 8% No
Behavior Visited pages, movement profile 8 5% 43 18% No
Consequence arguments 63 37% 148 63% Yes
Emotional Annoyance, mobbing 22 13% 21 9% No
Financial Money loss, unauth. bank transfer 16 9% 52 22% No
Impersonation Posts, messages on behalf 10 6% 63 27% Yes
Table 3: Data-related and consequence arguments used in categorization when considering risk fac-
tors
less frequently than experts discussed the data related to their behavior that is accessible
through their accounts (for example, search history). Lay users also discussed specific
consequences from a compromised account significantly less often, particularly the im-
personation that may occur when adversaries write messages in their name.
4.2.4 Discussion
As expected from prior research on risk perception and mental models in security (Sec-
tion 3), expert and lay users took very different approaches to categorize the Web sites.
While we did not directly elicit the mental models for the individual participants, their ar-
gumentation patterns and emphasis on certain aspects of Web risks indicate different men-
tal models. Beyond prior research, we found that the argumentation patterns of lay users
were more concerned with the type of page, whereas experts more frequently considered
risk factors. The differences in argumentation patterns underscore that communication of
Web risks needs to adapt to how the risk is perceived (cf. Section 2).
Moreover, when categorizing Web sites, lay users considered some consequences, such as
impersonation, less frequently, indicating a lower awareness of risks of those types. This
is in line with prior research that states differences in the awareness of risks between lay
and expert users (Section 3). Extending prior research, we found that lay users more often
resorted to abstract discussions of risk factors, instead of concrete consequences or sce-
narios, also indicating a lack of expertise that is necessary to actually formulate concrete
and detailed arguments. If the goal in risk communication is to close the knowledge gap
between expert and lay users, the communication needs to emphasize unknown risks, but
also build upon existing abstract notions of risks and extend these notions to complete the
risk picture for concreteness.
4.3 Individual differences in risk perception
Not only did the two groups of expert and lay users differ in their risk perception as ex-
































Figure 2: Proportions of data types used by the participants when considering risk factors
spectrum of perceptions and heterogeneous argumentation patterns. We selected a number
of particularly striking examples of these spreads and illustrate them through box plots of
the individual proportions in Figure 2 – detailing the data from Table 3.
One example for the broad spectrum can be found in the types of data that participants
referred to as being at risk. While the mean for using financial-data–related arguments is
15% of the risk-related arguments for lay users (Table 3), we see how broad the spread
within the 25/75 percentile is in the box plot, ranging from 0 to 33%. Thus, there appears
to be a broad spread in how significant entering, for instance, a credit card number is for
lay users. We see a similar pattern for behavioral data in the case of expert users. This
spread might be related to the level of privacy awareness of the individual expert.
The spreads become even more pronounced when we consider cases of arguing with cer-
tain types of data in which the means of lay and expert users are similar, but show widely
different spreads between participants within the groups. For example, in the case of ar-
guing through personal data being at risk, the means of the proportions are close for lay
and expert users (24%/19%, Table 3), but the box plots show that lay users are much more
heterogeneous in this respect than experts.
In addition to the patterns in the box plots for the main types of data that participants used
to argue about the risk while categorizing Web sites, we can observe similar patterns for
the different primary risk concepts and types of consequences as shown in Figure 3.
4.3.1 Discussion
For experts, the differences in perceptions may be explained by the differences in their pro-
fessional focus (i.e. system administration vs. security consultancy vs. security research).
It is not surprising that their range of backgrounds that we recruited them for influenced
their risk perception. Security researchers are confronted with different security problems,
often of more theoretical nature, than system administrators or security consultants. Since
the spread in argumentation is also wide for lay users, forming homogeneous mental mod-































































Figure 3: Box plots of the proportions of types of risk factors and consequences used when arguing
about risks
These findings indicate that we need to go beyond the current approaches of mental models
in warnings (Section 3) that attempt to build comprehensive mental models of expert and
lay users to develop general warnings. Conversely, the mental models need to be elicited
at a higher granularity if they should improve the effectiveness of the risk communication
through individualization – for example, for subgroups of certain expertise and preferences
(e.g., concer ng privacy).
5 Individualization for effective risk communication
As described in Section 3, prior research on applying the mental-models approach in se-
curity primarily focused on eliciting mental models of broad groups (lay/expert users) and
how we need to adapt the mental models to improve security behavior. Our study was
intended to explore options of combining the mental-models approach with the individu-
alization of security interventions for effective risk communication (Section 2). Individu-
alization then not only concerns the external factors (e.g., type of Web site, objective risks)
and the current situation (intention of the user), but also the individual’s mental model of
the specific security risks. Individualized security interventions will, in turn, not only im-
prove the warning as a one-time security intervention, but also help to adapt the mental
model as intended by Wash and Rader [WR11] to improve security behavior.
Building upon prior research on risk communication (Sections 2) and mental models (Sec-
tion 3), we gather and extend here the conclusions from our study on how to apply mental
models. We formulate four strategies for individualization from our results:
Emphasizing unknown risks Individual risk communication can, on the one hand, help
us point out the risks that a user might otherwise overlook in the intuitive or conscious risk
assessment because certain causalities are missing in their mental model. In our study, we
find the approach of emphasizing unknown risks suitable for example for behavioral data,
which might be at risk but was considered by lay users significantly less often than by
expert users. We can thus enrich and complete the mental model by pointing out the risks
that users have overlooked.
Complete the risk picture for concreteness Second, we found that numerous risks were
only considered at an abstract level by lay users. In individualized risk communication,
we can strive to complete the mental model also by connecting to the abstract notions and
adding the concrete implications and thus make the communication more effective (cf.
Section 2). For example, the abstract idea of potential financial consequences could be
enriched by that the attacker would transfer money from the user’s account.
Adapt communication to how risk is perceived Third, our study showed that individ-
uals differed in how they argued about the risks – for example, lay users significantly more
often argued through the type of the page than experts. Risk communication should ac-
count for these differences, since literature shows that the communication is more effective
if users can relate to it (cf. Section 2). This extends the previous strategy on connecting
the communication to known abstract risks by also taking into account how the individual
generally perceive risks – for example, through the context of use of a Web site, or whether
it is primarily a business or leisure-time context.
Increase granularity of mental models Fourth, for all above strategies, we need to
construct the user’s mental model of the situation and an ideal mental model that might be
deduced from expert knowledge. The level of detail of the user’s mental model needs to be
at a sufficient level of detail to identify the gaps in knowledge, the concreteness of current
knowledge, and the individual’s perception of the risk. To these ends, the granularity of the
mental models need to go beyond a lay–expert-user dualism as indicated from the spread
between the individuals in our study. It will also often not suffice to elicit a general mental
model of security, but needs to be more focused on the specific application area, such as
Web browsing in this paper.
We see two main challenges to these strategies that we will address in future work:
5.1 Eliciting the applicable mental model
Eliciting the individual mental models to enable individualized risk communication ap-
pears to be challenging because of the effort necessary to construct each mental model.
However, since the level of detail only needs to suffice for identifying gaps and aspects
to connect to, it should not be necessary to elicit full mental models from each individ-
ual user. Instead, we will pursue to elicit a range of typical mental models for a specific
context that can then be matched to the individual user.
We see two approaches to identifying which mental model to apply for the specific user:
explicit and implicit elicitation. For explicit elicitation, the user needs to provide enough
data points manually – for example, in form of completing a questionnaire or quiz on
causalities. In this case, the key point is how much data points are necessary and how
much are acceptable for users. We are currently developing an efficient questionnaire
and will assess how context-specific the elicitation needs to be. We will also look into
applying user typologies, such as based on the user’s privacy perception (e.g. the Privacy
Preference Scale [MAR74]) and the attitudes of users towards the technology (e.g. as in
the technology acceptance models [VMGF03]).
In case of implicit elicitation, either as addition or as alternative to explicit elicitation, the
applicable mental model needs to be extracted from the user’s behavior. One potential
approach is to use machine-learning techniques to learn from standard reactions to shown
warnings (“Remind me later”) or more sophisticated queries (“I know this risk”). Implicit
elicitation would also help to address the necessity of reacting to changes over time –
for example, from increasing expertise of the user. Further challenges include privacy
concerns from the sensitive data collected in the process of elicitation, and the handling of
multi-user devices and individuals’ multiple devices.
5.2 Supporting the developer and other stakeholders
While users may benefit from better risk communication, several other stakeholders in
the information security ecosystem may face additional challenges. For the software de-
veloper, it is already complex to create one user interface for risk communication. For
individual risk communication, the complexity significantly increases without appropriate
development support. We thus need clear methodologies to develop individualized risk
communication artifacts and appropriate knowledge bases as libraries and APIs to reduce
the effort of its implementation.
For IT administration, complications will arise in the area of training and helpdesk proce-
dures, since different warnings and behaviors of applications may be reported due to the
individualization. Accordingly, individualized risk communication will only be viable,
if it proves significantly superior. Considering the track record of current warnings, for
example in Web browsing, the base line might not be overly high, though.
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